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Political orientations, ideological self-categorizations, party preferences, and moral foundations of young Turkish voters

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ABSTRACT
Political ideology is often characterized along a liberal–conservative continuum in the United States and the left–right continuum in Europe. However, no study has examined what this characterization means to young Turkish voters or whether it predicts their approach to morality. In Study 1, we investigated in two separate samples the relation between young Turkish participants’ responses to the one-item left-to-right political orientation question and their self-reported political ideologies (conservative, socialist, etc.). In Study 2, we investigated the relation of moral dimensions as defined by Moral Foundations Theory to political party affiliation and political ideology. Results revealed that CHP, MHP, and AKP voters display a typical right-wing profile distinct from HDP voters. Findings regarding political ideology measures were consistent with party affiliations. Taken together, the findings reveal the distinctive nature of young Turkish people’s political orientations while supporting the predictive power of the one-item political orientation question.

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KEYWORDS Political psychology; Moral Foundations Theory; Turkish politics; left–right distinction; political party preferences

Introduction
‘Ideology’ is a word of French origin meaning ‘science of ideas.’ In modern political psychology, ideology refers to the moral, political, cultural, and social values of an individual or a social class. In Western contexts, ideology is often defined on the basis of a bipolar opposition (e.g. liberal–conservative in the United States; left–right in Europe). Whether this conceptualization is suitable for Turkey is unclear. Furthermore, while there have been attempts to explain the social and ideological profiles of the voters in the Turkish political...
system, there is no well-established theory that stands out and there is a need for further empirical studies to evaluate existing theories. We use Moral Foundations Theory – a recent theoretical framework that is purported to have universal applicability and has received wide attention regarding its ability to distinguish ideological camps – to explain the psychological basis of political ideology in Turkey. In the present set of studies, we first seek to characterize how political ideologies are seen in Turkey in a sample predominantly drawn from university undergraduates. We then conduct a broader study to test whether Moral Foundations Theory can explain the descriptive account of ideologies obtained in our initial findings.

**Political ideology in Turkey**

Political scientists have offered various characterizations to describe the Turkish political system. For instance, in Mardin’s conceptualization, those in the center are the socially and politically privileged minority whereas those in the periphery are the politically under-represented majority. Traditionally, the military/bureaucratic upper-class has been viewed as the center whereas the rural Anatolian majority are the periphery. This closely resembles an American-style bipolar characterization.

More recently, Öniş’s ‘global conservatism’ versus ‘defensive nationalism’ distinction pointed to a unique position of Turkey. In this characterization, the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi [Justice and Development Party]), the conservative ruling party in Turkey, has turned into a free-trade globalist party whereas the leftist parties (e.g. CHP [Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi], Republican People’s Party) which in Europe have adopted a more globalist outlook, have, in contrast, become enmeshed with defensive nationalistic politics. Öniş claims that there is currently no European-style social democratic party in Turkey. The fact that the CHP, which ostensibly represents social democracy, has traditionally supported state ideology and Turkish nationalism and collaborated with the ultranationalist MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi [Nationalist Movement Party]) in the 2014 presidential elections, supports this claim. In this respect, Öniş argues that the traditional left–right conceptualization featured used to describe party systems in Western democracies does not capture current Turkish politics. Furthermore, Arikan empirically demonstrated that the traditional left–right one-item political orientation question is not a good predictor of political preferences regarding governmental spending, emphasizing the differential characteristics of Turkish politics compared to Europe. Additional support for this argument comes from the claim that traditional leftist values like egalitarianism and caring for the poor are currently represented by political Islam in Turkey. Since we know of no empirical study on these issues, one aim of the present study is to investigate how similar or different leftists and rightists are in terms of moral foundations.
Özbudun proposed another dichotomy via his conceptualization of the left as representing secular values and right as representing nationalist, conservative, and religious (Islamic) values. However, there is ambiguity regarding who the leftists are. Both social democratic (e.g. CHP and DSP (Demokratik Sol Parti, Democratic Left Party) and socialist-leaning (e.g. ÖDP [Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi, Freedom and Solidarity Party], and, to some extent, the HDP [Halkların Demokratik Partisi, [Peoples’ Democratic Party]]) parties claim to represent the left side of the political spectrum. However, as previously noted, the CHP is ideologically rooted in Kemalism (which includes Turkish nationalism and republicanism) whereas the HDP is rooted in a mixture of social democratic and socialist ideas but claims ethnic Kurds as its largest bloc of voters. It is therefore unclear whether self-defined leftists tend to agree on basic values. Thus, the present study also aims to investigate how similar or different social democratic and socialist-leaning parties are in terms of moral foundations.

Empirically grounded typologies of Turkish voters’ political orientations have also produced mixed conclusions. One study proposed a tripartite distinction to capture the variation in Turkish individuals’ political orientations: secular/leftist, nationalist/conservative, and liberal. However, as noted above, leftists might be a heterogeneous group. Similarly, what ‘liberal’ represents in Turkey is not clear. According to Berzeg, while liberal denotes leftist ideology in the United States, it denotes rightist and conservative ideology in Turkey. In contrast, Olcaysoy and Sarbay showed that the liberal–conservative distinction also captures some basic psychological differences in Turkey in a way that parallels findings from the United States. They defined these terms relying on two culture-free features of conservatism: opposition to equality and resistance to social change, based on the ‘motivated social cognition’ framework. In contrast, Küçük proposed four ideologies to characterize the Turkish political structure: socialist, conservative, liberal, and nationalist. Difficulties with this classification include specifying the conditions under which nationalists and conservatives differ, where Kemalist nationalism fits in, and how it relates to the traditional left–right or liberal–conservative dichotomies.

The political orientation of Turkish individuals measured on the left–right continuum has been shown to predict Schwartz and Bilsky’s basic values and some political attitudes such as system justification. However, what left and right mean to people from different ideologies (e.g. Kemalism, Socialism, Conservatism, Nationalism, etc.) and whether they really differ in terms of basic moral values have not yet been systematically investigated. Therefore, there is a need to empirically specify the relation between political orientation and political ideologies at the descriptive level and to subsequently demonstrate the predictive power of these political variables in determining basic moral values.
Moral Foundations Theory

Moral Foundations Theory is a recently developed perspective that has not only helped to reinvigorate the field of moral psychology but also received wide attention in the field of political psychology, especially in terms of its ability to highlight the differential moral bases of various ideological camps.\(^\text{18}\) The theory is based on a wide range of anthropological observations and proposes five distinct foundations based on evolved intuitions.\(^\text{19}\) The care/harm dimension is based on caring for the offspring and kin. The fairness/justice dimension is based on the need to punish those who threaten within-group cooperation. These two dimensions – the ‘individualizing foundations’ – are equally important for both liberals and conservatives in the United States.\(^\text{20}\) The loyalty/betrayal dimension is based on the need to protect the in-group against threats from the out-group. The authority/subversion dimension is based on the need to form and maintain hierarchical power relations within one’s group and to benefit from this social structure. The sanctity/degradation dimension is based on the need to avoid contact with pathogens and other disease-causing agents. The feeling of disgust produced by these agents is supposed to generalize to unconventional sexual acts and to a tendency toward a purely materialist style of life. These latter three dimensions – the ‘binding foundations’ – make a harmonious society possible and are more important for conservatives than for liberals in the United States.\(^\text{21}\)

Since the Turkish political spectrum is difficult to define and is likely to be different from its American counterpart, it seems worthwhile to examine whether people of different political ideologies and party affiliations in Turkey differ in terms of their basic moral views. The usefulness of a Western-style conservative–liberal distinction for describing the Turkish political system would receive additional support if the relationship between moral foundations and political orientation (and ideological self-categorization) is similar in both contexts. To our knowledge, this would also be the first examination of moral foundations in a political context in Turkey.

The current study

The present study aims to address the gaps in the literature identified above in a predominantly undergraduate sample. Turkey has a large young voter presence. Approximately 37 percent of eligible voters are between the ages of 18 and 34.\(^\text{22}\) Thus, it is important to understand the political orientations of this group of people. While several political orientation measures (usually one-item self-placement) have already been shown to have reliability in the United States,\(^\text{23}\) the utility of the traditional one-item political orientation question in the Turkish context is mostly unknown.
We first descriptively examined where people from different political ideologies place themselves on a 1–7 self-reported political orientation scale using two different samples (Study 1). Next, we investigated whether people belonging to particular ideologies affiliate with particular political parties and whether these ideological positions are associated with distinct basic moral values (Study 2).

More specifically, in Sample 1 (Study 1), we expect that socialist-leaning ideologies (Marxist, communist, socialist, and anarchist) will differ from right-leaning ideologies (conservative democrat, ultranationalist, and follower of Sharia) on the one-item political orientation scale. In Sample 2 (Study 1), using a slightly different typology of political ideologies, we expect that Socialist participants will discriminate from Conservatives on the same political orientation scale. In a third sample (Study 2), we hypothesize that leftists will be less likely to support group-based moral foundations (binding) than rightists, and both groups will give equal importance to the individualizing moral foundations. We also explore whether voters that support different parties or different political ideologies will differ in terms of moral foundations.

Study 1
Sample 1
Method
Participants. Three thousand seven participants took part in the study. Participants with missing values were excluded from the analyses. Thus, a total of 2095 participants (1271 women, 824 men, mean age 24.37, SD = 8.24, min: 18, max: 78) were included in the analyses. 83.2 percent of the participants were from the age range 18–25. The majority of the participants (n = 1466) identified themselves as Muslim. Of the remaining, 44 were affiliated with a different religion, 347 were atheists, and 138 believed in God but were not affiliated with a religion. The majority of the participants (n = 1624) were ethnically Turkish. Of the remaining, 201 were Kurdish, 23 were Armenians, 35 were Greek, 93 were Arab, 96 were Georgian, 22 were Azerbaijani, and 1 was Bosnian.

Materials and procedure. Part of the data (14 percent) was collected online via snowball sampling. As there was no significant difference between the mean political orientation score of the online sample in comparison with the remaining paper-pencil sample (p > .05), we combined these two samples. The paper-and-pencil forms were collected from undergraduate university students in Istanbul in classrooms and from non-students through snowball sampling. Initially, a group of university students enrolled in psychology
courses at Doğuş, Yeditepe, and Boğaziçi University were approached and asked to complete the survey. At the end of the survey, these students and another group of undergraduate assistants were asked to help recruit a wider sample. Specifically, they were instructed to approach their friends, family members, and acquaintances. Participants reported their demographic background and the political ideology they identified with, choosing from a list of 13 (see below). They indicated their political orientation on a Likert scale from 1 (left) to 7 (right) and their religiosity level on a Likert scale from 1 (not at all religious) to 7 (very religious).

Results and discussion
Figure 1 presents mean scores of political orientation and religiosity organized by political ideology, prior to covariate correction ($N = 2095$). We conducted discriminant function analysis (DFA) in order to discriminate individuals with different political ideologies based on their political orientations and religiosity levels. As seen in Figure 2, Panel A, DFA revealed two significant functions; the first function (i.e. political orientation from left to right) explained 94 percent of the variance in the model (Canonical correlation = .70) and
maximally separated communists, Marxists, socialists, and anarchists from conservative democrats, ultranationalist, nationalists, and followers of Sharia (Wilks’ Lambda = .49, $\chi^2 = 1503.42, p < .001$). The second function (i.e. religiosity) was also significant (Wilks’ Lambda = .94, $\chi^2 = 121.03, p < .001$) and explained 6 percent of the variance in the model (Canonical correlation = .24). This function significantly separated liberals and apolitical respondents from the remaining ideological groups. Classification results obtained from DFA revealed that only 18.9 percent of original cases were correctly classified.

Based on the structure matrix canonical loadings of the predictor variables, the first function was strongly associated with political orientation (Canonical loading = .92). Thus, individuals with a stronger right-wing orientation were more likely to be classified as conservative democrats, ultranationalists, nationalists, and followers of Sharia group compared to other ideological groups (i.e. communists, Marxists, socialists, and anarchists). The second function correlated with religiosity (Canonical loading = .77) and religiosity was discriminant across political ideologies. Overall, these results suggested that, as predicted, conservative democrats, ultranationalists, nationalists, and followers of Sharia were different from communists, Marxists, socialists,

Figure 2. Discriminant function analyses results.
and anarchists in terms of their political orientation from left to right. In addition, our data successfully discriminated liberals and apolitical respondents from other ideological groups based on religiosity.

**Sample 2**

Both the left–right continuum as well as the ideological categorizations (e.g. nationalist, social democrat, etc.) are no doubt simplifications of complex political values, beliefs, and specific policy preferences. However, the findings from Sample 1 suggest that the level of simplification employed in our measures was not unnecessarily extensive. To the contrary, many ideological categories failed to differentiate sufficiently amongst each other. We therefore reduced the number of categories by combining the undifferentiated ones and attempted to replicate these preliminary findings in a new sample.

**Method**

**Participants.** A total of 1027 participants took place in the study via snowball sampling. Participants with missing data were excluded, resulting in 927 participants (736 women, 191 men, mean age = 22.06, SD = 3.46, min: 18, max: 47) in the final analysis. Ninety-five percent of the participants were from the age range 18–25. The majority of the sample were Muslims (n = 722). Eighteen participants were affiliated with a religion other than Islam. Seventy-five participants were atheists and 112 participants reported belief in God but no affiliation with an organized religion. The majority of the sample were ethnic Turks (n = 818). The remainder of the sample was composed of 78 Kurds, 21 Arabs, 7 Georgians, 2 Armenians, and 1 Greek.

**Materials and procedure.** Paper-and-pencil surveys were collected from university students in a classroom setting and from non-students recruited by snowball sampling with the same method used in Sample 1. The materials are the same with that of Sample 1 except that the participants were offered only six categories to indicate their political ideologies: Nationalist, Socialist, Social Democrat, Conservative, Apolitical (i.e. ‘not interested in politics,’ and None (i.e. ‘there is no ideology I feel particularly close to’).

**Results and discussion**

As in Sample 1, a DFA was run (N = 927). Figure 3 represents mean political orientation and religiosity scores organized by political ideology. DFA yielded two significant functions; the first function (i.e. political orientation from left to right) explained 94.6 percent of the variance in the model (Canonical correlation = .49) and separated socialists from conservatives (Wilks’ Lambda = .75, χ² = 268.63, p < .001).
The second function (i.e. religiosity) was also significant (Wilks’ Lambda = .98, $\chi^2 = 16.51, p < .01$) and explained 5.4 percent of the variance in the model (Canonical correlation = .13). The second function maximally separated apolitical respondents from the remaining ideological groups. Classification results obtained from DFA revealed that only 29.1 percent of the original cases were correctly classified (see Figure 2, Panel B).

That 57 participants out of 927 (6.4 percent) reported not feeling close to any ideology, combined with the large size of the Apolitical group ($n = 148$), calls into question the predictive power of ideologies for voting preferences and basic moral values. The same diagnosis applies to Sample 1 in which 237 people out of 2095 (11.31 percent) were either apolitical or unidentified. In the next study, we investigated whether ideological self-categorization and political orientation predict moral values.

**Study 2**

In this study, we adopted the theoretical rationale of Moral Foundations Theory which argues that morality is divided into five distinct foundations based on evolved intuitions: care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty (ingroup)/
As mentioned earlier, this theory has attracted wide attention for its ability to provide insight into the moral bases of conservatives and liberals in the United States. However, no study that we know of has systematically applied the theory (or examined moral variables within any other framework) in a Turkish voter sample.

**Method**

**Participants and procedure**

Three hundred and seventy-eight volunteers, recruited via snowball sampling, participated in the study. Initially, a group of undergraduate students, enrolled in a psychology course at Doğuş University, were approached and asked to complete the survey. Then, a group of undergraduate assistants were asked to help recruit a wider sample. Specifically, they were instructed to approach their friends, family members, and acquaintances. When missing answers were excluded, a total of 356 participants (203 females, 142 males, 11 unreported, mean age = 25.83, SD = 9.37, min: 18, max: 76) remained in the sample. Seventy-three percent of the participants were from the age range 18–25. Two hundred and ninety-nine participants identified themselves as ethnic Turks. Of the remaining 57, 27 were Kurds, 2 were Armenians, 7 were Greeks, 7 were Arabs, 10 were Georgians, 1 was Azerbaidjani, and 3 were unreported. The majority of the participants were Muslim (n = 295). Of the remaining 83, 16 were atheists, 31 believed in God but were not affiliated with a religion, 8 were affiliated with a religion other than Islam and 6 were unreported.

**Materials**

Political orientation was again measured on a 7-point scale that ranged from ‘left’ to ‘right.’ Similarly, religiosity was measured on a 7-point scale that ranged from ‘not at all religious’ to ‘extremely religious.’ Political ideologies were measured as in Sample 1 of Study 1 with the exception that the choice ‘there is no ideology I feel particularly close to’ was not included in the current version. In addition, the participants were asked to indicate their political party affiliation. Since adherents of several parties were too few Grand Unity Party: n = 4; İşçi Partisi (Labor Party): n = 6; ÖDP: n = 1; Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party): n = 1; TKP (Communist Party of Turkey): n = 2; ‘no party I feel close to: n = 22), only those that chose one of the four major parties were included in the analyses (AKP: n = 122, CHP: n = 94, HDP: n = 56, and MHP: n = 62; Table 1 presents the cross-tabulation of political ideology and party affiliation). These are also the parties that are currently represented in the parliament based on the results of the November 2015 general election. Although our sample is non-representative, the distribution
of voters for each party is very similar to the actual representation in the parliament.

Basic moral principles held by the participants were examined with the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ), a 6-point Likert-type scale consisting of 30 items translated into Turkish by Yılmaz, Harma, Bahçekapılı, and Cesur. Confirmatory factor analysis for the Turkish version of the MFQ scale showed adequate fit to the data in that study ($\chi^2(390) = 3372.87$, CFI = .78, RMSEA = .06, (90 percent CI [.05–.07]), SRMR = .08. The scale measures the importance of five moral dimensions (care/harm, $\alpha = .40$; fairness/cheating, $\alpha = .59$; loyalty/betrayal, $\alpha = .56$; authority/subversion, $\alpha = .66$; and sanctity/degradation, $\alpha = .63$, for this study) and is divided into two sections: relevance and judgments. The first section asks about what constitutes morality according to the participants (e.g. ‘whether someone adheres to the traditions of the society’). The second section asks participants to indicate the extent to which they agree with a set of moral judgments (e.g. ‘I think it is morally wrong that the children of rich people inherit large sums of money while the children of poor people inherit nothing’). A mean score was computed by taking the average of six items (three from each section) for each of the five dimensions. All data were collected by paper-and-pencil. The reliabilities of the subscales fell short of conventional criteria but this is consistent with published data from the non-English-speaking world and this shortcoming is argued to be due to the complex structure of moral judgments.

### Results and discussion

To examine the association between political orientation and moral foundations, a structural model was run. The estimated model included an observed (i.e. political orientation) variable and five latent variables (i.e. moral foundation factors). Each moral foundation latent variable was represented by six items obtained from MFQ. Moral foundation factors were significantly represented by MFQ items and their loadings ranged from .29 to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political ideology</th>
<th>AKP</th>
<th>HDP</th>
<th>CHP</th>
<th>MHP</th>
<th>I feel that I don’t belong any party</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Democrat</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kemalist</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Democrat</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamist</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apolitical</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ultranationalist</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
.60. The model showed moderate fit to the data, $\chi^2(359, N = 355) = 894.99, p < .01$, CFI = .78, RMSEA = .07 (90 percent CI = .06, .08), SRMR = .07. Results revealed that the political orientation of participants negatively predicted fairness ($\beta = -.16, p < .01$) and positively predicted authority ($\beta = .21, p < .001$), and sanctity ($\beta = .27, p < .001$). Note that higher scores on political orientation refer to increased right-wing orientation.

These findings partially overlap with previous American findings showing that while conservatives emphasize both individualizing (harm and fairness) and binding (loyalty, authority, and sanctity) foundations about equally, liberals tend to build their morality more heavily on the individualizing foundation. In this regard, the finding that conservatism (operationalized here as right-wing political orientation) is negatively correlated with fairness and uncorrelated with loyalty is inconsistent with the literature. However, this seems to be in line with some other findings in our study and supports the contention of Öniş that there is a lopsided democracy in Turkey. That fairness is more important for left-wing participants is also consistent with the findings regarding political ideology and political party affiliation (see the analyses below). The findings regarding party preferences described below indicate that right-wing parties emphasize fairness significantly less than left-wing parties. In addition, those who identify themselves with left-wing ideology in Turkey are mostly affiliated with CHP. Since CHP is not really a social democratic party but has a nationalist and localist bent, it is not really surprising that the left-wing participants in our sample scored as high as right-wing participants on the loyalty dimension, arguably an indicator of nationalism. These observations seem to explain the present findings that are prima facie inconsistent with the literature.

**Moral foundation predictors of political party affiliation**

Figure 2, Panel C shows a graphical representation of group differences on the moral foundation dimensions (i.e. sanctity, loyalty, authority, fairness, and harm) using the standardized residual scores.

DFA revealed three functions by using these residual scores as predictors; the first was significant ($p < .001$), explained 88.5 percent of the variance in the model (Canonical correlation = .53), and maximally separated HDP group from AKP, CHP, and MHP groups. The second and the third functions explained only 8.5 percent and 3.1 percent of the variance in the model, respectively (Canonical correlation = .19 and .12, respectively) and could not significantly discriminate between the groups. Although the combination of functions (i.e, 1 through 3) was significant (Wilks’ Lambda = .68, $\chi^2 = 97.75, p < .001$), the combination of the latter two functions and the third function by itself were not (Wilks’ Lambda = .95, $\chi^2 = 12.94, p = .11$; Wilks’ Lambda = .99, $\chi^2 = 3.46, p = .33$).
Based on the structure matrix canonical loadings of the predictor variables (i.e., moral foundations dimensions), the first function was strongly associated with sanctity (Canonical loading = .62) and modestly associated with loyalty (Canonical loading = .31). Thus, individuals high on sanctity and loyalty dimensions were less likely to be classified in the HDP group compared to other political parties (i.e., AKP, CHP, and MHP). The second function correlated (albeit non-significantly) with the authority (Canonical loading = .70) and fairness dimensions (Canonical loading = .57), but these dimensions were non-discriminant across political party preferences (see Figure 2, Panel C).

Classification results obtained from DFA revealed that only 37.5 percent of original cases were correctly classified. This modest classification accuracy was largely driven by the high proportion of individuals whose political party affiliations were CHP being misclassified as being in the AKP or MHP group. On the other hand, the classifier was better able to distinguish HDP supporters (see Table 2).

To see more clearly whether these differences are organized systematically according to the distinction between individualizing versus binding foundations, care/harm and fairness/justice dimension scores were combined to form an individualizing foundation score and the other three dimension scores were combined to form a binding foundation score (see also Figure 4, Panel B mean scores for the five-factor solution).

In terms of the individualizing foundation, the HDP group ($M = 3.99$, $SD = 0.70$) was significantly higher than the AKP ($M = 3.36$, $SD = 0.96$) and the MHP groups ($M = 3.36$, $SD = 0.96$, all $p$s < .01), but did not differ from the CHP group ($M = 3.68$, $SD = 1.01$, $p = .39$). The CHP group was marginally different from the AKP group ($p = .075$) and did not differ from the MHP group ($p = .39$). The present findings also revealed that the HDP group ($M = 2.60$, $SD = 0.91$) gave significantly lower importance to the binding foundation than all the other three groups (all $p$’s < .0001). The CHP ($M = 3.54$, $SD = 0.84$), MHP ($M = 3.52$, $SD = 0.73$), and AKP groups ($M = 3.38$, $SD =

### Table 2. Cross-validated classifications.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AKP</th>
<th>CHP</th>
<th>HDP</th>
<th>MHP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Original</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHP</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDP</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHP</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cross-validated</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHP</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDP</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHP</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Italicized values represent percent correctly classified.
0.77) did not differ from each other (all p’s > .53). These findings in Turkey are inconsistent with the broader literature: The United States findings reveal no differences between liberals and conservatives in terms of the individualizing foundations while in Turkey, people who are affiliated with HDP, arguably the least conservative of the major parties, differed from those affiliated with AKP and MHP. This pattern of results also reveals how close CHP (a supposedly left-wing party) and MHP (a supposedly right-wing party) supporters are to each other: They are the two groups who scored highest on the loyalty dimension, arguably an indicator of nationalism.

The HDP group gave significantly lower importance than all other groups to the binding foundations, a typical leftist pattern. This set of results also suggests that the AKP, MHP, and CHP groups lean equally toward the conservative end of the political spectrum in terms of their moral foundations in the sense of attaching importance to the binding foundations and that CHP supporters do not display the typical social democrat pattern that might be expected of them.

**Moral foundation predictors of political ideology**

Are the findings regarding party preferences summarized above consistent with what is revealed when the same analyses are repeated by replacing party preferences with political ideologies? Figure 5 presents the mean individualizing and binding scores of participants with different political ideologies.

The highest scores on the individualizing foundations belong to the socialists, Islamists, and social democrats. All right-wing groups except Islamists scored low on this foundation. The highest scores on the binding foundations belong to the Kemalists, the ultranationalists, and the Islamists. The surprising aspect of these results is that the Kemalists, who are usually seen on the left side of the political spectrum, have moral sensitivities similar to right-wing
ideologies. As Kemalists are known to vote mostly for CHP (see Table 1), these findings are consistent with those regarding party affiliation and moral foundations.

As depicted in Figure 2, Panel D, DFA revealed two significant functions; the first function (i.e. sanctity) explained 59.7 percent of the variance in the model (Canonical correlation = .47) and separated socialists, social democrats, and liberals from other political ideologies (Wilks’ Lambda = .64, $\chi^2 = 117.67$, $p < .001$). The second function (i.e. authority and harm) accounted 19.7 percent of the variance in the model (Canonical correlation = .30) and separated socialists, social democrats, conservative democrats, nationalists, and apoliticals from other ideologies (Wilks’ Lambda = .83, $\chi^2 = 50.06$, $p < .01$). Classification results obtained from DFA revealed that only 24.4 percent of the original cases were correctly classified. The results regarding the first function indicates that Kemalists are not different from other right-wing ideologies although they generally self-identify themselves as leftist.

Although CFA analysis indicates that political orientation is the unique predictors of fairness, authority, and sanctity dimensions of moral foundations, contrary to that theory’s claim of universal applicability, the one-
item political orientation question still has predictive power for determining moral foundations. Thus, one can conclude that the latter is a simple predictive, albeit limited, tool for the Turkish political structure as for Western countries. One alternative for future research is to differentiate political ideologies on resistance to change and opposition to equality and to define Turkish conservatism on this basis.

Conclusion

The present studies represent the first attempt that we are aware of to examine moral foundations in the same context as fundamental political psychological variables (party preference, ideological group identification, and political orientation). As hypothesized, we found that socialist-leaning ideologies (Marxist, communist, etc.) differentiated from right-leaning ideologies (conservative democrat, nationalist etc.; Sample 1), and the Socialists differentiated from the Conservatives (Sample 2) on a standard one-item political orientation scale. In Study 2, the findings regarding moral foundations partially supported our predictions and revealed interesting patterns. We found that political leftists are less likely to support authority and sanctity as moral foundations than political rightists, but no significant differences in the loyalty dimension emerged. Contrary to our expectation based on the literature, political leftists were more likely to support fairness as a moral foundation than political rightists. Both party preference and political ideology results generated highly convergent inferences and provided a potential explanation for these unexpected results: Only HDP voters differed from other parties, and CHP voters were not distinguishable from AKP and MHP voters in the binding foundations. One may conclude that young HDP voters located in Northwestern Turkey are the only group with a European-style socialist outlook and do not identify with Kurdish nationalism as is sometimes implied. The recent efforts on the part of HDP to change their image from a Kurdish party to one that embraces all of Turkey, along with the positive voter response to this change, is consistent with this interpretation.

On the right side of the spectrum of political ideologies, self-reported conservative democrats, ultranationalists, and Islamists do not significantly differ from each other and, like American conservatives, attach considerable importance to the binding foundations. Interestingly, Kemalists scored just as high on the binding foundations even though they generally self-identify as leftist. This supports Öniş’s claim that CHP is dominated by one type of nationalist ideology and does not represent social democracy, and is also consistent with the conclusion that Kemalists are a typical right-wing group. On the other hand, the results also suggest that the approach of social democrats in Turkey to binding moral foundations is not significantly different from that of right-
wing ideologies, which is generally not consistent with what is found about social democrats outside Turkey.\textsuperscript{36}

Like Kemalists, who self-identify as leftist but display a right-wing profile on moral foundations, Islamists also have a peculiar profile in the sense that they give high importance to the individualizing moral foundations as leftists do. This is actually consistent with the literature.\textsuperscript{37} Özbudun states that Turkish Islamism defends traditional leftist values like equality and caring for the poor.\textsuperscript{38} Unlike their right-wing counterparts in other countries Turkish conservative democrats and ultranationalists care less about individualizing, compared to binding, foundations.\textsuperscript{39} Thus, the results show that extreme leftists (socialists) and extreme rightists (Islamists) resemble each other in terms of the individualizing moral foundations whereas those at the center-left (CHP) and the center-right (MHP and AKP) resemble each other in terms of the binding moral foundations. This also supports the claim that democracy in Turkey is a lopsided one.\textsuperscript{40} The dynamics that make up these patterns in Turkey deserve further scrutiny.

Another conclusion from the study is that the one-item political orientation scale commonly used in Western contexts has the power to predict moral foundations even though the Turkish ideological landscape appears more complex and social democracy in Turkey, unlike Europe, emphasizes binding foundations. This also suggests that the liberal–conservative/left–right classification is a useful simplification in Turkey.\textsuperscript{41} Future studies should look into the question of whether the one-item political orientation question can predict other psychological variables (e.g. personality traits and cognitive style). In addition, some researchers argue that ‘left’ and ‘right’ mean different things to different people and that social and economic attitudes may differ widely within each category. Future studies should investigate this issue in the Turkish context.\textsuperscript{42}

Clearly, these preliminary findings and interpretations regarding psychological characteristics of voters need to be investigated further. The representativeness of our samples was heavily constrained by the sampling method we used and this is perhaps the most important limitation of our studies. However, the reader must note that the present investigation rested largely on a comparison of diverse groups of people (be it in terms of party preference or ideological group). Whatever sampling biases may have existed in our method should have applied more or less equally to the different groups that we recruited. Thus, while the results may not give a fully accurate account of Turkish voters in general, they should still be capable of revealing robust similarities and differences across these groups, especially given the relatively large samples with which we worked. We should also acknowledge that the results may shed light more specifically on Istanbul votership than the rest of Turkey. For instance, it is possible for CHP voters in Izmir differ significantly than those in Istanbul or for HDP voters in Diyarbakır to have more...
nationalistic tendencies than those in Istanbul. In other words, we urge caution for these findings since our data are based on a non-probabilistic and non-representative set of samples. Our religiosity measurement is also based on one item, which can be seen as a limitation. One should note, however, that there are previous studies showing the utility of this simple religiosity item in the Turkish culture.

All in all, by adopting established Western theoretical frameworks while attempting to remain sensitive to local nuances, we believe the current research contributes meaningfully to the clarification of the nature of ideological profiles in the Turkish population as one of first such attempts and sets the stage for addressing many interesting questions.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. Rokeach, Beliefs, Attitudes and Values; Jost, “The End of the End;” and Tedin, “Political Ideology and the Vote.”
3. Haidt, Righteous Mind.
4. Mardin, “Centre–periphery Relations;” see also note 2 above.
5. See Kongar, Türkiye’nin Toplumsal Yapısı, for a similar argument.
6. Önüş, “Conservative Globalists Versus Defensive Nationalists.”
7. Önüş, “Conservative Globalism at the Crossroads;” see also Ayata and Ayşe, “The Centre-left Parties.”
9. Özbudun, “Changes and Continuities.”
10. Özbudun, “Changes and Continuities.”
12. Obviously, any typology is a simplification of the real world and ignores much of the variation within the types that it proposes. Therefore, it is a truism that not just leftists but also conservative and liberal groups are heterogeneous. What we intend to state by this sentence (and similar statements that we use throughout this paper) is that the heterogeneity that we believe exists in the type ‘leftist’ might be too important to ignore and might therefore come at the cost of insight (i.e. explanatory power). As political psychological
researchers, our task is to arrive at a typology that presents the best balance of simplification and insight.

15. Jost et al., “Political Conservatism.”
19. Because the moral foundations are based on evolved intuitions, the theory argues that these foundations should be universally applicable. However, it does not claim that this is the final list of foundations and admits that there could be other foundations that deserve to be added to the list or that operate in some cultures but not as much in others (see note 18 above).
21. Ibid.
22. TÜİK, “Profile of Voters in the Most.”
23. See note 1 for a discussion for American politics and note 6 for a discussion for Turkish politics.
30. For a detailed discussion see also Yılmaz and Sarıbay, “Differentiation of the Political Ideologies and Conservatism in Turkey.”
34. Haidt, *Righteous Mind*.
36. For a detailed discussion of the state of social democracy in and outside Turkey see Öniş, “Conservative Globalism at the Crossroads.”
38. Özbudun, “Changes and Continuities.”
40. See Öniş, “Conservative Globalists Versus Defensive Nationalists” and Arikan, “Values, Religiosity and Support for Redistribution.”
44. See Yilmaz and Bahçekapılı, “Without God, Everything is Permitted” and Yilmaz et al., “Analytic Thinking, Religion, and Prejudice.”

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